Should you care about who guards who ? v1

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***

As the Toronto Raptors snatched a big win in Wisconsin against the Bucks on January 15, something interesting happened.

Both Mike Budelholzer and Nick Nurse used an intriguing defensive strategy versus the other team’s star : Giannis Antetokounmpo and Pascal Siakam. Both teams willingly chosed to guard the best and/or bigger opposing threat with rather small defenders.

Which leads to this question : should you care about who is guarding you in today’s NBA ?

***

First, Nick Nurse.

In the middle of the 3rd QT Nurse called a Box-And-One versus Giannis Antetokunmpo. But the trick here is who Nurse chosed to guard Giannis : Justin Champagnie. Not only did the size and strength differential seemed pretty odd, as Champagnie stands at just 6’6 with good-but-not-great 200lbs frame versus Giannis incredible 6’11 bulky physique, but moreover Toronto had athletes like OG Anunoby and Pascal Siakam on the floor at the same time. Or even Chris Boucher, someone who doesn’t have the same type of strength but at least has the size and length Champagnie is lacking to bother Antetokounmpo properly.

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When Nick Nurse first brought back the Box-And-One to NBA Prime Time Spotlights back in the 2019 Finals, Fred VanVleet had the task of following Stephen Curry everywhere on the floor. Matching Curry’s body type extremely well (speed, mobility, upper body strength and length), VanVleet seemed like the perfect defender to put on Curry. He was one of Toronto’s primary option to guard Curry in traditional man-to-man schemes anyway, so it does make sens to ask him to stick to Curry while the four other players are playing zone.

The idea is quite simple : let’s put our most competent defender on Curry, more specifically the most adequate to guard him effectively, plus, an extra-helper from the zone (sometimes two) depending on where Curry is on the floor. This “let’s match-up as well as possible from an individual standpoint, then help” principle is the main idea of the strategy.

Since then the Box-And-One has become a frequently used scheme in today’s NBA, with that same goal in mind : getting the best individual match-up on the opponent’s star, and then, using the zone as an additional way to bother him.

Here’s an exemple of the Warriors giving that treatment to Darius Garland this season, using Andrew Wiggins and his length + mobility to bother him.

An other example here as Golden State uses Gary Payton II this time in that role, the most adequate Warrior to match-up with Trae Young’s blazing speed.

And an other one here from last season, as Toronto used OG Anunoby’s length and strength versus Luka Doncic.

 

Even the Phoenix Suns went to a Box-And-One this season, trying to guard Stephen Curry. And although Mikal Bridges doesn’t have the same body-type as Fred VanVleet or Stephen Curry, it was still a move to match-up as well as possible to Curry from an individual standpoint, as Mikal can make up for his lack of speed with his huge wingspan and enormous strides (covering the same amount of ground, if not more, than a smaller/quicker guard).

 

 

Yet on January 15, Nick Nurse didn’t do any of that. Even though he had maybe two of the ten best individual Giannis-defenders in the entire league in Anunoby and Siakam, he went with the 6’6-200lbs two way contract Justin Champagnie to be the One in the Box-And-One scheme vs Giannis. Common sense would suggest that, first of all, it isn’t the entent of the Box-And-One where you traditionnally put your best defender on the most dangerous opponent and play zone everywhere else, and secondly, had Giannis managed to make a move or attack him one-on-one there’s absolutely nothing Champagnie could have done to bother Giannis, let alone stop him.

But that’s exactly where Nurse differs from that reasoning and “common sense” around a Giannis-Champagnie match-up.

Indeed, 1vs1, Champagnie can’t do anything versus Giannis…but who said anything about letting him attack Champagnie One-on-One ?

Here lies the true intent of this particular Box-And-One strategy : what’s going to stop Giannis isn’t the guy in front of him, it’s the zone behind him and the guys helping on the drive. Nurse thesis is pretty simple : you can’t stop Giannis one-on-one from getting to the rim, you just can’t. No one can. Hence you’re going to have to bring help anyway, and since you must do that you might as well be as good as possible on these rotations and help defenses. That’s what matters most.

Ultimately Giannis can’t run over Champagnie or any other defender he has in front of him, he can’t barrel into his guy without fouling : he still has to go around his defender with his speed and/or long strides. So in a way, it’s doesn’t matter all that much who is the guy in front of him Giannis has to go around. But on the other end, what’s going to decide whether or not he takes a shot at the end of his drive, or whether or not the shot is a good enough attempt quality-wise and if Giannis is going to make that shot or not is directly based on how good is the help at the basket and/or in the paint.

Nurse thesis here is that the quality of the Helper is much more important than the quality of the individual defender standing in front of him.

Thus it actually is a better assets management to have Anunoby, Boucher and Siakam help at the rim or during the drive. Their size and length allow them to help much more effectively around the basket than a smaller guard or wing would. The guy standing in front of Giannis is going to get overwhelmed or even blown by Giannis anyway, so you might as well use your top defenders to make great rotations at the rim since it (almost) doesn’t matter who’s standing in front of Giannis.

Having Champagnie On-Ball + Anunoby helping at the rim or simply shrinking the floor is a much better use of your personnel, and a much more effective scheme than the other way around. Champagnie can’t help as effectively at the rim or on “Stunts” during the drive as Anunoby, Siakam and Boucher can with their much better physical tools. If you’re considering the fact that Giannis is going to beat any defender in front of him, you might as well *not* put your best defenders in that position but rather use them as helpers, where they can make a bigger difference.

Meanwhile, Champagnie speed and ability to move quickly is also a key component of these schemes : his job is simply to move quick enough to stay in front and wait for help to come.

At least, that’s the theory. Let’s see how things shake out.

***

Play #1

Here Milwaukee is just running a simple Pick & Roll for Giannis, and as Champagnie is caught onto Connaughton’s excellent screen, Anunoby comes up to contain Giannis.

The Bucks did get an open corner 3 out of this, as Giannis delivers a great pass to take advantage of Toronto’s outnumbered weakside of the zone.

Yet it still is a win for the Raptors from a philosophical standpoint, or as americans says, a from “sorcerer’s standpoint” (Harry Potter joke) : you don’t want to give up open 3s, especially not in the corner, but the goal is to stop Giannis from going in the paint. You can’t take away everything so you need to prioritize and be willing to give up some things at times, and Nurse’s philosophy has always been to take away the paint even at the cost of giving up 3s.

Play #2

Next possession, still Box-And-One. You can even see Fred VanVleet pointing to Champagnie to take Giannis as they’re running back on defense.

This time Giannis isn’t in a typical ball-handler role but rather tries to flash in the middle of the zone to get a 1vs1 in the paint. Reacting to this, Anunoby slides torwards him, thus leaving DiVincenzo alone for an other wide open 3.

Play #3

Next possession, still Box-And-One : Champagnie on Giannis, VanVleet and Anunoby on top, Siakam and Boucher at the bottom of the zone.

This time, Milwaukee gets more aggressive trying to punish the Champagnie-Antetokunmpo match-up : Giannis tries even more intensly to establish a post-up position, this time on the low block instead of in the middle of the zone. But Champagnie actually fights very well to deny him that position, and Boucher’s length bother DiVincenzo pass.

This is even more of a great play by Champagnie when you consider the fact that had Giannis possessed the ball and attacked him on a face-up or even back-to-the-basket, Champagnie would have had more difficulties to contain him. But by doing the work early, he prevents Giannis from being that dangerous.

Play #4

On the very next play, after the ball went out of bounds Toronto gets into the Box-And-One once again.

And this time, after failling to get the ball on the previous two possessions, Giannis comes up a the top of the key way outside in order to finally have it. There, he has the ball and can finally attack his match-up.

However the problem is pretty obvious here : surely by going so far outside he did managed to get the ball at last…but to get back inside and near the basket, he has to face both Champagnie and the Zone.

Look at that crowd between Antetokunmpo and the basket, how all four defenders are around the paint, ready to jump and help on a Giannis drive :  VanVleet and Siakam at the nail, Boucher and Anunoby near the rim.

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Also, look at Champagnie’s placement : sagging off Giannis, ready to backpedal and slide to contain a drive.

So, what does Giannis do ? He just pulls up for three.

Which can be viewed as a positive play (especially since he makes the shot) depending on what point of view you’re seeing all this. From Antetokunmpo’s standpoint he sees a zone infront of him and a defender sagging off, thus you could argue he makes the right play by not forcing things and taking what the defense is giving him.

However, bigger picture, from Milwaukee’s standpoint : does Mike Budenholzer like that shot ? Not sure. Over the years Giannis improved slightly on his jump-shot but this shot in particular, the Giannis ISO pull-up from 3 or even long 2 is still a question mark. And one could argue it has been a win for the defense overall everytime Giannis took that shot over the last 3 or 4 seasons.

Furthermore it *may* not be that great of a shot from Milwaukee’s perspective but it *certainly* is a great shot for Toronto, there is absolutely no doubt about it. This is exactly what “chosing what to give up” looks like : yes, it is an open 3 and yesthe shot even goes in. But bigger picture, as a defense you love to make him settle for these jump-shots instead of getting to the paint.

It’s simple math : 60% on lay-ups off drives for Giannis is 60*2 = 1.20 Points per Shot Attempt, not even including Free Throws which usually happen a lot when he drives. Milwaukee’s offensive rating is at 1.12 Pts/Shot, meaning a Giannis drive is obviously boosting the Milwaukee’s offensive production. Even more : compare his driving efficiency of 1.20Pts/Shot to his pull-up productivity of 0.79 Pts/Shot and you’ll see how this is blatantly a win for Toronto.

So yes, it can be considered as good play by Giannis to take what the defense is giving…but big picture it’s a Nick Nurse win.

After this Giannis attacked in transition as fast as possible on the very next play, trying to get anything before Toronto’s defense could settle (and, indeed, he got Free Throws). Next play Toronto switched to a regular man-to-man defense with Siakam guarding Giannis. Then, Giannis went to the bench.

***

Now, Mike Budenholzer.

Interestingly enough, in the very same game, nay, very same quarter of NBA action, Mike Budenholzer chosed to do something really similar on the other end of the court.

Just a few minutes after Giannis went to the bench, Budenholzer elected to put Donte Divincenzo on Pascal Siakam.

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Obviously it may seem a little odd considering one one hand that DiVincenzo was the smaller player on the floor for Milwaukee at that time (George Hill, Pat Connaughton, Khris Middleton and Bobby Portis), and on the other hand Toronto didn’t have any dominant big/inside threat on the floor requiring strong defenders such as Portis to stick to them : neither Chris Boucher nor Precious Achiuwa are dangerous post-ups or paint scorers.

In other words : why put your smallest defender on the floor on Siakam, a much taller player and someone who likes to use his size/length to shoot over people or go around them ? Why not put the strong and size-similar Bobby Portis on Siakam ? Or even Khris Middleton ?

Well, the reasoning behind this move is very similar to Nick Nurse’s a couple of possession ago vs Giannis : DiVincenzo’s role is to stay in front of Siakam with his quickness, and then, Milwaukee is going to bring extra-help from bigger players like Portis or Middleton. Great help defense, in fact, thanks to their very usefull size and length when trying to protect the paint, contest a shot or even force Siakam to give up the ball once in traffic. At least much better help defense compared to the “threat” of the smaller DiVincenzo rotating to the middle with his unimpressive 6’4 frame and 6’6 wingspan.

DiVincenzo isn’t the one guarding Siakam, the team as a whole is, and more specifically defensive rotations and “Stunts”. Just like it wasn’t about Champagnie guarding Giannis but rather the Zone around Giannis. Plus DiVincenzo tremendous quickness and ability to put pressure and defend right in the opponent’s airspace is something that could even bother Siakam quite a bit, considering his ball-handling is sometimes a tad too loose. Neither Portis nor Middleton are able to apply this kind of disruptive pressure.

Here it is.

Play #1

Toronto tries to run a quick cross-screen to free up Boucher inside but it doesn’t work, and from there, VanVleet just tells Siakam to attack his match-up.

And as expected, although DiVincenzo applies good pressure, Siakam indeed manages fairly easily to overpower him and get all the way inside. Yet there is no panicking in the Bucks defense : Portis comes to help as planned… and Siakam just can’t keep pushing his smaller defender without also driving into a bigger one. One who has the tools to bother him really well, even more if it’s a 2vs1.

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Thus all Siakam can do is spin (raise your hand if you’ve heard this before) and kick it out to Chris Boucher, who burries the 3 despite Middleton’s great contest.

Yet, despite Boucher making an impressive shot…it is far from necessarily being a disaster for Milwaukee’s defense. Just like Giannis’s pull-up 3 wasn’t either for the Raptors. Under Budenholzer the Bucks have build their defense on the principle that you have to protect the paint at all cost, even if it means giving up threes : 30th, 29th, 26th and 28th in number of 3s allowed since 2018-19. Boucher makes it here but if you keep defending that way, the Paint vs 3s trade-off is immensly worthy for the Bucks.

Also, one important thing to note : there is absolutely nothing wrong with what Divincenzo did in that sequence. He stayed in front of Siakam, waited for the Help defender to clogg the paint and prevented a Paint Shot.

Play #2

Next play, same action : VanVleet sets a cross-screen for Boucher and once again,it doesn’t pay off. But this time VanVleet wants the ball back, so Siakam gives it back and goes in the Dunker Spot as VanVleet plays his ISO vs George Hill.

Once again here, playing a much smaller defender on Siakam doesn’t hurt Milwaukee as DiVincenzo makes a tremendous Box-Out on Siakam.

This is an area where mismatches can be exploited : offensive boards. Maybe the best recent example of this is the 2020s NBA Finals when Miami chosed to play zone vs the Lakers and Anthony Davis completely destroyed Kendrick Nunn’s boxouts (or lack-there-of) collecting offensive rebounds after offensive rebounds.

So, no, you can’t create any mismatch and expect not to get punished on the boards. You can’t say you’re going to put Trae Young on Nikola Jokic because it allows you to have Clint Capela as a free safety and helper. But here DiVincenzo in feisty enough (and Siakam not that huge) that you can get away with it.

However Toronto still to gets the rebound. If you look closely, four Bucks players are boxing out really well, but the ball just happens to rebound too far where Achiuwa can get it.

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Play #3

Therefore we get an other possession of Siakam vs DiVincenzo. And this time Siakam wants to make the most of it, not wait patiently until someone else takes a shot.

He calls for the ball and gets it.

Once again the smaller Donte DiVincenzo holds up really well on this ISO despite his lack of physical tools. He stays in front, sliding quickly before Middleton helps and overloads that side of the court, forcing Siakam to stop his move and give up the ball. And yet again…Boucher makes an incredibly difficult contested 3.

Quickly after this, Siakam went to the bench.

***

What these few minutes of NBA action teach is quite interesting regarding the future of NBA defenses.

Why were Nick Nurse and Mike Budenholzer able to get away with this ? How can you put smaller defenders on such big bodies, who also happenned to be great offensive players , by the way, and not just tall and long dudes ? Why is this working ?

To put it in the most simple way possible : because Champagnie isn’t the guy defending Giannis, the team is. DiVincenzo isn’t the one defending Siakam, the team is. Gone are the days of traditionnal man-to-man defenses with help defenses strictly coming from the weakside, prohibited rotations from one-pass away, terrorising thoughts of giving up 3s and barely 10 to 15 zone possessions for a whole season for almost every single NBA team.

Offenses evolved over the years, thus defenses are evolving as well. Yes, on offense 3s and lay-ups are what you want relative to other shots, mid-rangers in particular. But defenses are thinking this through even more in today’s NBA : from a defensive standpoint you don’t want to give up 3s and lay-ups…but if you have to chose knowing you just can’t defend everything perfectly, numbers say protect the paint first and foremost.

Simple math :

• NBA avergae efficiency at the rim = 65%, thus 65*2 = 1.30 Points generated per Shot Attempt
• NBA average efficiency from 3 = 35%, thus 35*3 = 1.05 Pts per Shot.

It’s not even close. And this doesn’t even take into account Free Throws, which are incredibly high efficient shots (around 78% league average = 1.55 Pts per Shot) you get quite often when attacking the basket.

This is not a 2022 trend though as both Milwaukee and Toronto were some of the very first teams to use that knowledge to their advantage. Both Bucks and Raptors have been willingly giving up a ton of threes for many seasons now in order to take away the Paint. This is nothing new but in 2022 though, more and more teams are realying heavily on these schemes, to an ever greater degree.

Therefore in this context and in these schemes, it is never one player defending one man. Not anymore. And especially not offensive stars like Giannis and Siakam. Until a couple of years ago, you absolutely needed a defensive specialist to guard the opposing superstar and make his life miserable. Now the team as a whole is guarding the opposing star and trying to make his life miserable. The team, altogether, is preventing him to get to the basket and/or forcing him to give up the ball. Defensive schemes work as a collective effort as a whole more than ever.

What matters the most now is how good you are as a team, meaning consequently how good you are at helping at the rim, shrinking the floor, making rotations on time, excecuting closeouts, making “stunts” or clogging the paint.

That’s why Nick Nurse wants to use Anunoby’s and Siakam’s length in a zone, in order to get the best disruptive zone possible. That’s why Mike Budenholzer wants to keep Bobby Portis off of Siakam in order to have Milwaukee’s biggest body flashing into the paint on rotations to deter shots at the rim.

It used to be “you’re as weak as your weakest individual defender is”, especially in a switch-heavy and weak-link targetting context. Now it is more than ever “you’re as good as your help defense is”.

Hence, answering our initial quesiton : in that regard, knowing it is the team defending altogether a player and not just one player standing in front of him, then…no, it really does not matter all that much who is guarding who as long as you’re executing the gameplan properly and bringing adequate help.

Whether it’s Anunoby’s bulky frame and hard wall-offs keeping Giannis out of the Paint, or a threatening Zone defense ready to jump all over him and deterring him from going inside, what’s the difference ? Both scenarios serve the main purpose of Nick Nurse’s plan : do not let Giannis get near the basket. At the end of the day it probably doesn’t matter what you do to get there as long as you do : we’re just learning there are other valid way to accomplish a defensive goal than only and exclusively the traditionnal way of getting the best defender on the best offensive player and relying on this one guy to “man-up”. After all, Basketball is a team sport. A game of interraction between 10 players on the floor, not just a series of one-on-one actions.

What this quarter of NBA action illustrates in a more emphatic way than usual is the fact that it’s not one player defending a star anymore, it’s one team defending a star. It’s not Justin Champagnie’s job to “defend” Giannis Antetokoumnpo even though he’s the one in front of him, it’s really the Zone around Giannis when he tries to post-up or the Zone in front of Giannis when he wants to drive from the outside. The rotations coming from every angles are “defending” Giannis, not Champagnie himself. It’s not Divincenzo’s job to “guard” Pascal Siakam, it’s about the Stunts and helps occuring during Siakam’s drive.

That’s how you can get away with Champagnie on Giannis. Because it’s not really “Champagnie on Giannis”.

***

Former Toronto and Nick Nurse assistant, Nate Bjorken, coached the Indiana Pacers for a very brief period of time, the 2020-2021 season, but still managed to display this philosophy as well as some defensive creativity in his short stint as head coach.

Back in January 2021 the Dallas Mavericks were visiting the Pacers. Initially Bjorken opted to defend Luka’s Pick & Roll with an aggressive “Hard Hedge” by Domantas Sabonis but Doncic was just doing whatever he wanted versus that coverage. Which lead Bjoken to attempt some Box-And-One sequences…with the much smaller TJ McConnell on Luka Doncic (6’1 vs 6’8, 190 lbs vs 240 lbs).

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Interestingly what these sequences demonstrate is not what you would expect intuitively : Doncic was still making plays left and right…but McConnell wasn’t the problem at all. If anything, what this game illustrate is exactly what we just explicited : “you’re as good as your help defense is”.

Indiana’s ability in the Zone Part of the Box-And-One was far from being as competent as Toronto can be at its best, in terms of covering ground, rotating quickly and affecting plays. Turns out the size, length, speed, strenght, knowledge and IQ of an Anunoby-Siakam-Boucher-VanVleet bunch allow them to have a much better impact than a Sabonis-Aaron Holiday-Doug McDermott-Malcolm Brogdon combo. Indiana’s Zone had more leaks : closeouts to contest 3s weren’t as quick nor as effective, stunts/paint cloggs were not as intimidating nor deterring Doncic to drive inside, and even obvious mistakes occured as defenders rotated to the 3pts line instead of inside to prevent a 100%-probability wide open lay-up.

And still : it wasn’t all that bad overall on these Box-And-One possessions.

Despite occasionnal mistakes, Indiana still managed more or less to force the action away from the rim (the main goal) and make Dallas attempt 3s instead. Doing so with the 6’1 TJ McConnell in charge of “defending” 6’8 thick and strong Luka Doncic. Part of Bjorken’s reasonning calling that particular Box-And-One had one main purpose, as we explained earlier : Domantas Sabonis was getting abused in traditionnal man-to-man defense where he had to execute a “Hard Hedge” coverage on Doncic’s Pick and Rolls but was unable to bother him enough to disrupt Dallas’s offense.

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In a zone, Sabonis wouldnt be directly involved in the action, thus hopefully wouldn’t be the one the success of the entire possession depends on. Instead, the Zone as a whole, the team altogether was the one standing in front of Doncic, or at least the one trying to stop him. With Sabonis hidden somewhere in that zone.

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With that said it is also possible Bjorken was trying to hide TJ McConnell as well in a way. The much smaller McConnell, adding good offensive value and running the point for the Pacers, wouldn’t have been a great defender on the other end of the floor versus Doncic’s huge frame bullying him on ISOs and post-ups. In a Box-And-One, Doncic simply could not target McConnell as easily. The former Sixer simply had the task to stay as much as possible in Doncic’s airspace and let the Zone behind him contain him.

In this cas you actually do care about you is guarding who…but not in the way you’d think about it traditionally. That philosophy of putting a weaker defender in the frontline and hoping for the rest of the team behind him to balance things out is not that uncommon.

In fact, it is exactly what the Denver defense revolves around.

Starting in 2018-19, Mike Malone’s Nuggets began using more aggressive P&R coverages with Nikola Jokic. Which, in a way, seems pretty odd : Jokic was a liability on defense back then and someone the entire league was attacking through P&Rs. Why would you ask someone not even able to execute a proper traditionnal “Drop” defense, a coverage limiting his movements as a very heavy and not-that-mobile big, to do even more ? Why ask that player to step out much higher on screens and be more aggressive ?

Well, it may seem paradoxical but it was a way of hidding him on defense.

On one hand you could argue asking more of Jokic was going to be way too much and he wouldn’t be able to affect plays flying all over the perimeter since he couldn’t do it in a much smaller area, the Paint in a “Drop” Coverage. Yet, on the other end, the purpose wasn’t for Jokic to stop the action himself on the screen, but rather to use him as part of a 2vs1 on the ball-handler (him and the ball-handler’s defender). Denver was forcing the ball out of the ball-hander’s hands and orienting the action towards the rest of the floor.

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Contrary to what you’d believe intuitively, Jokic’s aggressivess was not all that risky. In fact it was a way to protect him by making opposing offenses attack the weakside and/or other defenders on the floor. And it worked quite well, having great Off-Ball talents like Paul Millsap, Gary Harris, Torrey Craig, Jerami Grant, PJ Dozier, Miles Plumlee or Juancho Hernangomez making smart rotations to make up for the aggressive P&R coverage. Even guards like Monte Morris, and Malik Beasley are competent team defenders, getting to the right spots and executing closeouts and X-Outs.

Thus illustrating the point we made earlier : “you’re as good as your help defense is”.

Even with a not-yet-slim-Jokic (at that time) defending the ball, Denver was able to built a top 10 caliber defense thanks to excellent off-ball defender successfully executing schemes designed to rely on their strength as a group.

An other example of this “should you care about who guards who ?” case occured in the 2021 Playoffs.

During Game 2 of the Western Conference Finals between the Utah Jazz and the (then healthy) Kawhi Leonard and Paul George LA Clippers, Quin Snyder used a very similar strategy.

Contrary to what you’d guess, late in that game as the Jazz was trying to seal the deal Snyder actually used his weakest defensive wing, Bojan Bogdanovic, on LA’s superstar Kawhi Leonard. Just like Nick Nurse used Justin Champanie, not Anunoby nor Siakam on Antetokumnpo. Yet Snyder didn’t took a page out of one of his NBA colleague’s playbook that day, but rather one of a NFL fellow head-coach, Bill Belichick.

Although you’d logically want your best defender on the best opposing offensive players, Belichick applies a different logic in these kind of situations. The thing is, it’s not just Kawhi Leonard on the floor for the Clippers : you also have to worry about Paul George. An other All-NBA superstar. Dealing with multiples dangerous receivers, Belichick often opts for a different approach : use your best corner on the second best receiver, and defend the best receiver with only your second best corner…plus, extra-help from a safety.

The idea is quite simple and revolves around maximizing your personnel to the fullest : by putting your best defender on the second best offensive player you get the maximum value out of this particular match-up. And quite often you can even deter/prevent any offense coming from him. Then, you still have a double team dealing with the opponent’s best player.

From there, as a defense you’re making the offense face a dilemma : should you play through a double team in order to get your best guy involved…or should you attack the very best defender on the floor, plus, doing it with someone else than your very best offensive player ?

One-on-one, individual talent matters. On a Double Team, it’s just about outnumbering the receiver.

Hence Belichick states through his schemes than a less talented cornerback can do a fine job on a doubleteam simply by working with a second defender, while his best talent at corner will add significantly more value on a 1vs1 situation. For example at the peak of the Chief-Patriots battle for the AFC during the late 2010s Bill Belichick would rather (and actually did) put Defensive Player of the Year Stephon Gillmore on Sammy Watkins, taking Watkins out of the equation, and contain Tyreke Hill with two defenders.

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This is exactly what Snyder did in G2 of the West Semis : Royce O’Neale, Utah’s very best wing defender, was asked to defend Paul George while Kawhi Leonard was handled by Bojan Bogdanovic…as well as Rudy Gobert helping every single time on Kawhi’s drives.

In order to see the true value of this particular setting, let’s see what the other possibilities were :

• swaping O’Neale and Bogdanovic gives you a much better match-up on Kawhi, especially with Gobert still helping…but this leaves PG free to attack Bogdanovic and create more offense than he’d be able to versus O’Neale.

• why not then keep these match-ups and ask Gobert to help Bogdanovic, not O’Neale ? Well, it is a possibility but you also have to realize a double team is a considerably more effective way to stop someone than a one-on-one even with an elite defender. Hence, not that it would be a complete waste of a double team to use it on George but it seems fair to state that you want to use your very best defensive card (the double-team) on the biggest threat.

• lastly, why can’t Gobert help on both George and Kawhi ? He can, but it may be a bit too much risky : the rest of the defense has to make up for Gobert leaving his own man open so you probably don’t want to over-use it. At least i’m guessing this would be Snyder’s reasoning, other coaches may be willing to help very aggressively on every Paint Touches but Snyder’s Jazz isn’t one of those defense with an overly-aggressive mentality to protect the pain.

This way of doing things actually is the more balanced (and maybe the best, periode) way to set up your defense and contain two superstars. Even though you wouldn’t think at first not tu put your best defender on the opposing best player.

In the end, Snyder’s strategy ended up working extremely well.

Bogdanovic did a great job staying in front and trying to offer all the resistance he could on Kawhi’s strong drives. He wouldn’t have been able to guard him all the way though by himself, but Gobert’s helps deterred Kawhi to keep pushing and get shots at the rim. Meanwhile, Paul George was reticent to attack such a good match-up in Royce O’Neale, and when he did, O’Neale did a great job as expected.

Quin Snyder took a page out of Bill Belichick’s playbook in 4th QT of G2.

https://twitter.com/NBEinstein/status/1403805898066247684

One important thing to note here : this wouldn’t have worked with anyone in Bogdanovic’s spot, just like Budenholzer’s and Nurse’s schemes would not have worked either in the Toronto-Milwaukee game using any defender…nor versus any opposing star.

What makes it work here is the fact that Bogdanovic, although not an elite level On-Ball defender, can still be a competent one. Specifically Bogdanovic has decent size and strength to do a good enough job versus Kawhi Leonard. But with someone like Jordan Clarkson, or even Donovan Mitchell and Mike Conley, it’s a different story. You just can’t call this in order to hide a poor defender (or a mismatch) on the best opposing player with the idea that Gobert’s help will save the day. You just can’t. Had Bogdanovic not been as tall/strong as he is, Kawhi’s drives would have probably create much more problem for Utah. Or, even, Kawhi would have just been able to get to his spot, elevate and shoot over the smaller defender : a quality shot for the LA’s offense.

The same could be said for the Toronto-Milwaukee game.

Justin Champagnie, although lacking size compared to Giannis, still had good tools. He’s not *that* small and has quickness as well as good defensive technique to hold his own just enough. In a way, one could argue you shouldn’t care about who guard who in these situations…but only to a certain degree, obviously. You just can’t call a Box-And-One versus Giannis with Trae Young, or even Tyler Herro as the One. Same could be said about the Siakam-DiVincenzo match-up : what DiVincenzo lacks in size, he makes up for it greatly with terrific quickness, fundamentally sounded defender with the ability to put great pressure on the ball-handler.

But most importantly : this strategy can’t work versus any player.

Pascal Siakam and Giannis Antetokoumnpo share the same weakness : a subpar outside jump-shot. Had they possessed a quality jumper, there would have been absolutely no way to get away with a smaller defender on them. The whole idea is to focus on the fact that the Zone or the Stunts and Helps will prevent Giannis and Siakam to do damages in the paint, so indeed : you don’t need size in front of Giannis. You need size, length and good timing in the backline of the defense and around the paint. But could you do the same versus Kevin Durant or Kawhi Leonard ? Absolutely not.

You don’t mind giving up the outisde jumper to Giannis and Siakam but you do versus quality shooters. For as competent and pesky as they are, Justin Champagnie and Donte DiVincenzo just can’t do anything versus a KD’s jumper. It’s not maths here, it’s physics. And a KD’s jumper, or even a Booker’s or Tatum’s jump-shot, that’s too good of a shot for the offense. You want to give up mid-rangers and pull-ups as a team, but not to stars and superstars. They can kill you with this shot, all day long.

This specific strategy was possible only because it was Giannis and Siakam, two poor-to-average outiside jump-shooters.

***

Now, let’s be clear.

The point here is not to say teams will or should mix match-ups and not try to get good defenders on offensive stars. Nor that you can get away with putting poor defenders on good offensive players. There’s still indubitably immense value of having elite individual defenders trying to slow down offensive stars even though you still plan on bringing extra-help at any point of a drive, an ISO or even a P&R. By the way, this is just a couple of possession here and there, for the fast majority of the game both Nurse and Budenholzer went with traditionnal match-ups, as Anunoby and Siakam guarded Giannis, who himself had to defend Pascal Siakam for a long period of time.

The point here is not at all that team can and will do this and get away with this, but rather, the fact that these sequences demonstrates perfectly the value of team defense and the spirit behind a certain type of defensive philosophy. This isn’t the norm, surely, however it is an excellent illustration of the complexity of team defense today, the importance of helpers and the choices you have to make on the basketball court about what do you want to give up, or conversly, what you’re trying to protect at all cost. Even if it does mean at times to get creative, like Nick Nurse and Mike Budenholzer did.

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